Inter-Country Comparisons of Labor Force Trends and of Related Developments: An Overview by Jacob Mincer
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
INTER—COUNTRY COMPARISONS OF
LABORFORCETRENDS AND OF
RELATED DEVELOPMENTS: AN OVERVIEW
JacobMincer
WorkingPaper No. 1438




Iam grateful to the authors and discussants of the country papers
for informationand data supplied beyond the original call of duty.
Special thanks to Richard Layard and to Mark Kiliingsworth for
helpful comments on a first draft of this report. Thanks also to
Machiko Osawa for patient and cheerful research assistance. The
researchreported here is part of the NBER's research program in
LaborStudies. Any opinions expressed are those of the author and
not those of the National Bureau of Economic Research.NBER Working Paper #1438
August 1981
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and of Related Developments: An Overview
ABSTRACT
This paper is a survey of analyses of women's labor force growth in
12 industrialized countries, originally presented at the conference in
Sussex, England in June 1983. The main focus of the conference papers and
of the current survey is on growth of the labor force of married women in
the years 1960—1980. Trends in fertility, family mobility, and wages also
receive attention as related developments.
Married women's labor force growth was observed in all countries,
expect for the USSR after 1970, when labor force rates of women reached the
level of men. Growth rates differ among countries. They apparently respond
to growth in real wagesand/or to growthin education, but response elastici-
ties differamong countries. Estimates of these elasticities contained in
the country paper were helpful in predicting the trends.
Other findings include: tSbiquitous declines in fertility and growth
of divorce in the 1970s. Both developments are related to longer ran labor
force growth. In all countries wages of women were lower than wages of men.
The 1960 average gap of 38% narrowed to 29% in 1980. Factors related to








Inter—Country Comparisons of Labor Force Trends andof
RelatedDevelopments: An Overview
I. Recent Developments and the Economic Hypothesis
Between 1960 and 1980 labor force rates of women rose in most of the
industrialized countries, continuing longer term though less apparent
trends. These trends are due mainly to the growth of labor force
participation of married women. As a comparison of the left and right panels
ofTableI indicates for the 12 countries under review,' the labor force rates
of narried women grew about twice as fast as therates of all women.
Indeed,labor force rates of single women declined ifwomen of school
agesare included, and grew little beyond school ages. Inthe past the
participationrate of single women was much higher than the rate ofmarried
women.Single women and other women not currently married usually worked in
the labor market after completion of schooling and prior to rnarrLage or
remarriage.Their labor force rates, therefore, did not grow much over time,
and in many cases declined asschooling lengthened. On the other hand, only a
small proportion of married women was in outside employment at the turn of the
century, to take the urban U.S. as an example. Most of them dropped out of
the labor force after marriage or at the first pregnancy. As the century
progressed and the economies and urban employment grew, especially in the
service sector, increasing proportions of married women returned to the labor
market for shorter or longer intervals after the childbearing andchildrearing
period.Concurrent, and not unrelated declines in fertility made it possible
for these intervals of non—participation to decline in frequency and in
duration. In the most recent stage of the evolution of women's labor force—2—
participation, the alternations of labor market and of household activities is
giving way to a more sustained commitment to the labor market. Roughly
speaking, this stage was reached in countries where over half of married women
are working. The most important manifestation of growing continuity of
participation in these countries is that recent cohorts of women take much
less time out of the labor market for child care. Thus, in the most recent
decade the fastest labor force growth is observable among mothers of small
children. To some extent, the greater continuity of market employment was
achieved by a reduction in fertility and by a switch from part—period to part—
time (short hours) employment: The latter grew most rapidly in the decade of
the 70s when employment ofmothers grew fastest. Nonetheless, these trends
suggest a convergence which is already observable in the countries in which
labor force rates are high: In the most recent stage, the demographic
distinctions by marital status and presence of children produce greatly
reduced differences among the labor force participation rates of these groups.
A trend to convergence among demographic groups does not mean that family
status is no longer an important factor in women's labor supply. Although it
is less important in affecting participation rates, it continues to infLuence
the allocation of time and energy between market and household activities in
terms of hours of work, work effort, and job choices. The substitution of
part—time for part—period work and the rather universal persistence of the
concentration of women's employment in so—called "female occupations" are
indicative.2 Even where differentials in labor force ratesby marital status
are small, the differentials by sex are still large. Only in the.IJ.S.S.R. is
the labor force rate of women nearly equal to that of men. This peak level
was reached in 1970. In the countries we surveyed the average labor force
rate of married women grew from 30 to 48 percent points between 1960 and—3—
1980. At this pace it will take another half—century to reach 90 percent
participation rates. It could take less time, if the relative rate of growth,
60% in the 1960—1980 period, does not decelerate ——anunlikely possibility on
purely arithmetical grounds. The participation rate of Swedish married women
surpassed 75% by 1980, but most of the growth there was in part—time work, in
contrast to the U.S.S.t., where part—time work is negligible.3 In Australia,
Britain, France, Germany, and the U.S., labor force rates of married women
crossed the 50% mark by 1980. A decade earlier, the typical married woman in
all countries (with the exception of the U.S.S.R.), was primarily a
homemaker. It is perhaps not coincidental that feminist movements in these
countries spread just about when the 50% "tipping point" was reached in the
1970's. At the other end of the spectrum, in Japan, Spain, the Netherlands,
and Italy the activity rates of married women are still quite low, despite
rapid recent increases. In these countries married women have moved from the
early stage of very low participation after marriage to the next stage of
intermittent participation, in the past two decades.
It is important to note that our preferred definition of labor force
participation is restricted to paid employment outside the home ——a
definition which makes choices between household and market activities
unambiguous. This definition rules out the possibilities of joint activities
primarily in rural households and in cottage industries where paid work is
performed at home. Self—employment is a more ambiguous category in this
respect, and we tried to exclude it. It was not possible to adhere to these
restrictions in all cases. However, inaccuracies created by a few deviations
from the definition are minor, since the ruled out sectoxs are small. The
exception is Japan: A relatively large proportion of Japanese women are still
household workers, on the farm, in cottage industries, or in family—4—
businesses. Since these groups are declining in importance, while employment
outside the household is growing, data which do not single out the latter show
a horizontal, or more precisely a mild U—shaped trend with the upturn
observable only since the mid—seventies. Here, the focus on outside
employment is desirable not only on theoretical grounds but also as a study of
the vanguard of future developments.
Japan is also illustrative of a much larger group of countries not
included in our collection. The shrinkage of the farm and of other household—
based employment with economic development obscures much of the rise of paid
employment of urban married women in LDCs which are experiencing economic
growth, when both groups are defined as labor force participants. The
resulting U—shaped trends in aggregate women's labor force rates take a long
time to materialize.4 The very rapid postwar economic growth of Japan
telescoped these developments into a much shorter interval, so the U—shaped
aggregate change is observable within the comparatively short period of two
decades, 196O—l98O.
Two widespread and far—reaching developments which appear to be
associated, at least temporally, with the growth of married women's labor
market activities have been declines in fertility, and increases in divorce
(or separation) rates. Although fertility had long—term downward trends in
most of the industrialized countries since the 19th century or even earlier,
these trends were resumed in the late 1960s after interruptions by postwar
"baby booms." The decline in fertility rates was ubiquitous (Table 2)6 and
accelerated in the 1970s, at which time also divorce and separation rates rose
in an unprecedented fashion (Table 3), while marriages were delayed and
marriage rates declined. Although the declines in fertility might be viewed
as a symmetric downward phase ("baby bust") of the baby boom, these declines—5—
are by now of much longer duration then the upswings were. They also appear
to be independent of the timing and amplitude of the demographic cycles across
the countries we studied. It is therefore more plausible to view the
shrinkage of family size and of duration of marriages as a trend, the pace of
which may vary, rather than as a cyclical phase.
That the declines in family size and in duration of marriage provide an
increased scope and motivation for greater labor market commitment of women is
a reasonable conclusions However, economists do not view this relation
between family and labor force trends as unidirectional.7 Some degree of
mutual causation and feedback is also plausible: Fertility and marriage
patterns adjust to greater labor force commitments. Conversely, exogenously
caused reductions in fertility, due to more efficient and less costly
fertility control, encourage labor force participation, and so does the
prospect of family instability. Moreover, even without a direct link between
fertility and labor force participation, both may be viewed as jointly
dependent variables: That is, both are simultaneously influenced by other
variables, notably by the process of economic growth. Especially important in
thisprocess are: the growth of real wages, growth of education, and of
urbanization. Superimposed on economic growth are also legal—institutional
developments, including laws pertaining to the family, equal pay legislation,
and taxation. These developments were likely to affect trends in some of the
countries, regardless of whether the public policies were specifically
designed to affect them.
The basic economic model which is the starting point of economists'
analyses of women's labor supply8 centers on the family context of work and
leisure decisions. Family members are seen to divide their time among
leisure, market work, and home work. Historically, women hadprimary—6—
responsibility in household production, including especially child care.
While an increase in family income increases the demand for leisure, the
distribution of work between home and market depends on the individual's
relative productivities in the two sectors: The greater the market wage
relative to home productivity (at zero hours of market work) the greater the
shift to market work. In this simplest formulation, growth of wonen's labor
force over time is directly related to economic growth: A rise in market wages
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the positive substitution effect of the increased market wage is stronger than
the negative effect (on market work) of increased family income.
Early studies of cross—section data in the U.S. revealed a dominance of
the substitution over the income effects in analyses of labor supply of
married women. Cross—section as well as longitudinal analyses of other
countries in the present volume also show, for the most part, positive
substitution effects of women's wages which exceed in absolute size the
negative effects of family, or husbands' incomes.9 The exceptions, in which
the two effects roughly cancel are found in Japanese studies,10 in one of the
several gritish cross—section samples, and in the Italian cohort analysis, but
not in the cross—section. The dominance is also small in the German cross—
section sample for labor force participation, but large for hours of work.
When all country estimates (Table 6) of women's wage elasticities are
averaged, a figure close to unity is obtained. The average income elasticity
was much smaller, about —.4. On average, these findings are consistent with
the upward trends in married women's labor force participation in the
countries we studied.
The present collection of studies in twelve countries is designed to
provide insights into labor force trends, their causes and consequences, in—7
each of the countries. It also provides an opportunity to test the viability
of the economic hypothesis not merely on average, but also on a cross—national
basis. With only twelve observations on trends, generalizations from the
findings can be only tentative. Nevertheless, the findings describe
developments during the past two decades in most of the industrialized
world. The value of the much richer findings in each of the country analyses
is not affected by the outcome of the experiments reported in this cross—
national overview.
II. Trends in Labor Force Rates
(a) Country Analyses:
Although the underlying economic model is basically common to all the
studies in this volume, estimates of labor supply (in terms of labor force
participation rates) of married women differ in methodology, speciEtcation of
variables and of functional forms, and in some of the data definitions. 1ost
of the estimates are based on cross—sections, and a few (U.S., Britain, Italy)
on cohort data. The explanatory variables included were wages (WF) of wives
in cross—sections, but wages of all women in cohort data and in time series,
wages (WM) of husbands in cross—sections, but of all males in cohort data and
in time series. Women's education levels (E) served as alternative or
additional variables to their wage. Income from sources other than earnings
(Y0) was an additional variable to wages or earnings of husbands. Presence of
pre—school (N) children in the household was another variable alternately
excluded or included in the estimates. Although the magnitudes of effects
differed from country to country, the signs of the variables were consistent
with the economic hypothesis and with previous research in the U.S. and
elsewhere. The substitution variables (wages of women or their education) had—8—
strong positive effects on labor force participation in iñost cases, and in
most cases the positive wage elasticities exceeded the negative incoie
elasticities1' by a sizable margin. Pre—school children had a negative effect
on participation. The partial endogeneity of fertility behavior does, of
course, make these "effects" questionable. Their estimated effect represented
in most cases a relatively minor contributioq to the variation in labor force
participation. This variable was left Out for time—series prediction, in any
case. Educational attainment of women was strong when used in lieu of the
wage variable, but remained positive and significant in some of the studies
when used as an additional variable. A few studies used an alternative
concept of labor force participation for the dependent varianle, when work
histories were available in the sample of wives. It is measured by the ratio
of years spent working to number of years elapsed since conpietion of
schooling. This variable (called RELP) approximates more closely the concept
of life—time labor force participation.
The basic relation P=f(W, WM, E, Y0, ...)wasestimated in each study,
but methodological differences involved alternative techniques such as two—
stage procedures (the first being a wage equation) or OLS, and forms such as
logit, probit, or linear probability equations. Most of the studies tried to
apply the estimated parameters to the observed changes over two decades (1960—
1980) in order to "predict" or "explain" the trends observed in the time
series in the respective countries. Several of the papers exhibit alternative
techniques or functional forms within the same country, yielding alternative
parameter estimates. Some also cite or borrow cross—section estimates from
other studies of their country data.
The following table indicates in summary form the procedures used in each
country study in estimating parameters of the P—function, and their predictive—9—
performance in time series. Pairs of alternative estimates are listed for 6
countries (Australia, Britain, France, Spain, Japan, and the U.S.). Out of
the 18 sets of predictions, 9 performed fairly well. Only Britain (1) and
Japan (1) yielded wrong signs; all others predicted upward trends. Apart from
Germany where the trend was underpredicted, estimates usually erred on the
high side.
It is worth noting that predictions were more successful in those few
cases where information on past work experience was available and used to
estimate cross—section parameters. (France (2), Japan (2), Spain (2), and
U.S.) Such information apparently reduces the estimates of wage elasticities
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Table 6, eq. 1











Table 19, Panel B
Cain( 1966)
Table 5
a Tables in thecountry papers. Supplement =numericalestimates provided by
authors. Japan(2) and U.S.(2) are from external sources, not provided by the
authors.
























Therelative success of the econometric nodels in close to half of the
country studies makes the economic hypothesis a serious contender for jriinacy
in explaining the pervasive social trends of our time. Nevertheless, the
success is only partial, and the differences in data, methodology, and in
econometric specification may raise doubts about generalizations.
What can we learn from the collection of studies going beyond the
enumeration of findings in each of them? One simple exercise is to look at
mean values of the basic variables across the 12 countries. During the 1960—
1980 period the average per country growth in participation of married women
was 2.84% per year. The average growth of men's wages,13 =4.377.per year
and of women WF =5.15%per year. Applying the average income elasticity a =
—.37and the average wage elasticitya =1.02,14we obtain
=1.02x 5.1 —.:37x 4.37 =3.64%
an overprediction of the actual average rate of growth of the labor force of
married women (73% compared to 57% growth over the two decades). However, if
growth of women's wages is measured by the growth of men's wages, the
prediction is quite accurate! =(1.02—.37)x 4.37 =2.84%.
These calculations are based on Japan(a) in Table 1. When Japan(b) is
used, the average=3.05%.The predicted growth, using average elasticities
of col. 2, Table 6 is now 3.50% when P =
a1F ÷ ,anover1rediction,
and 2.80 when P =
(a1
+
a2)4,amilder underprediction. On average, it
appears that the economic model works rather well. However, averages can
conceal as well as reveal. A more demaniing question is whether differences
among countries in observed trends can be explained by the same hypothesis.
(b) Cross—National Analysis
In its simplest formulation, the cross—section labor force equation is— 12—
mostconveniently written as:
lflP =+o lnW + a2j mY1, where i =countryindex, and the aj's
are elasticities.
Denoting growth over time by a dot over the variable:
= +lFi + =1,...,12 (1)
(1) couli-i serve as the time series equation, where Y, WFi measure growth of
family income and of women's wages in eachcountry.
If structural parameters do not differ significantly among countries,
there is no subscript on the 's in (1), which are simply averages of trie
a. Otherwise, the estimated a1 have to be applied to (i.e., multiplied by)
the independent variables so that the estimating equation is:
Pj =+61(a11Fi) ÷2(a21)(2)
The predictions based on (2) are unbiased if =0,and =
62
=1.If
and 2 <(while o=0),the (sun of) variables (alJFi) and (a2Y)
overpredicts the observed trends, on average. In this case either the
elasticities (a1) or the rates of are overstated, or a2 and Y understated.
Before we implement the inter—country regressions of type (1) and (2),
consider the choice of independent variables: While levels of women's wages
are not necessarily strongly correlated with husbands' or family incomes in
the cross—section, over time wage and income growth of men and women are
strongly correlated, especially across countries, even if the growth rates of
women's wages differ somewhat from growth rates of men's wages within
countries. But it is not only riulticollinearity that makes the separation of
the variables problematic. There is a more basic conceptual problem that
might militate against the use of women's observed wage growth as a variable
in time series: Although growth of market productivity in the economy
potentially affects wage growth of men and women similarly in the long run,— 13—
theactual change in observed average wages of working womenmaybein parta
resultof changing labor force selectivity as women's labor force grows,
rather than a cause of labor force growth. Changes in compositions of working
women by education, age, and continuity of labor force experience affect the
average growth rate of their wages differentially, even if potential market
productivity of the average woman in the population were to grow at tile same
rate as the productivity of men.
The conceptually correct but difficult to measure variable is the average
market wage of all women of working ages, not merely of those who are
currently observed working. If it is assumed that market productivity of men
and women grew at the same rate over the past several decades, the best
approximation to the growth of all women's wages would be the growth of men's
wagesWM, where selectivity is a comparatively minor matter.'6 It is
possible, however, that over relatively long stretches of time potential wages
of women grew more rapidly than wages of men, in which case the use of
observed wage growth of women may be preferable to the use of as a
substitute, especially if changes in selectivity of working women are not
systematicor minor.
Our data (Table 3) show that wages of working women, grew, on average,
faster than wages of men in most countries. These changes in relativewages
are analyzed in section IV. It appears that the faster growth of working
women's wages is in part due to selectivity by education i labor force
growth, which leads to an upward bias in of working women as anexplanation
of women's labor force growth. However, the faster observed growth of than
of was also partly due to the faster growth of education in the population
of women17 (Table 10). Nobiasattaches to WF on this account, if women's
educational growth is viewed as largely exogenous.— 14—
1omen'seducational level in 1970, and growth 60—80 are shown in
Table 4. A faster growth of education of women may be expected if (a) family
income elasticity of the demand for educating daughters exceeds the income
elasticity of demand for educating sons,'8 or if (b) increased investnents in
daughters' education is a response to an increasing probability of labor
market participation of women. The latter possibility implies an endogeneity
of the excess of educational growth of women compared to men, hut the effect
ofIncreased enrollments onsubsequent educational attainraent of women takes a
long time: about two decades between the average age of completion of
schooling and the average age of potential working life. Consequently, the
growth of all women's education, may serve as an alternative to growth of
wages of working women, as an indicator of all women's gain in potential
earning power. Of course, education may also affect labor force decisions for
reasons other than potential earnings. As previous research suggests, such
effects work in the same direction as wages. The strength of these addLtional
effects is not clearly established in the literature.
In the regressions shown in Table S below, we experiment with the use of
W4 wage growth of men, WF wage growth of working women, and SE—growth of
female education as alternative measures of growth of potential wages of all
women. In view of the preceding discussion we maysuspectF of an upward
bias, and of a downward bias when used as proxies for the correct growth of
women's wages. Other variables we experimented with were: levels of women's
education E70, of urbanization (Urb70), and of women's labor force
participation 70' each measured in the mid—year 1970. The scope of market
opportunities is likely to be wider the higher the level of women's
education. The same is true of a more urbanized economy. FinalLy, at high
levels of participation (such as are current in the U.S.S.R. or Sweden) there— 15—
islittle room for further growth of labor foce rates: they cannot exceed
100%. This purely arithmetical factor, however, is not likely to matter in
the middle ranges.
In Table (5) we show regressions of P (percent rate of growth of married
women's labor force participation) on the variables discussed above, following
specification (1) which ignores the structural differences in parameters (ni)
among countries. It should be noted that although the dependent variable is
growth of labor force races of married women, ages 20_5919,theindependent
variables (except for F70) are defined for all men and all women.
The results of regressions in Table 5 are suggestive. If growth of
potential market earning power of women is raeasured by the growth of real
wages of men (W1) alone, the variable is not significant. But when both wages
of men and of women are included, both are significant ——especiallyWF; each
has the expected sign, negative for W,, positive for WF, and the latter
exceeds the former in size.
Levels of labor force participation (in 1970) serve as an arithmetic
correction (col. 3) for the form of the dependent variable,20 but were not
significant when the U.S.S.R. was excluded. Urbanization levels were
positively related to labor force growth, when the U.S.S.R. was excluded from
the sample. The education variables were not significant.
As would be expected on theoretical grounds, the correlations are
stronger when the Japanese labor force is restricted to married wotieii who are
paid employees (Japan (a) in Table 1).
If the differences in income and substitution elasticities (e) across
countries are not merely noise, the next step is to take them into account,
that is, follow specification (2) in analyzing inter—country differences in
trends. This we proceed to do in Tables 6A and 6. The cross—section— 16—
estimatesfrom which the elasticities were calculated were described in the
table of "Country Estimates: Procedures and Predictions" in the previous
section. As was indicated., more than one set of estimates is available for
some of the countries. Table 6 presents in col. (1) elasticity estimates
whichthe authors produced or supplied and used in their predictions. These
were listed in line (1) of "Country Estimates." Col. (2) lists the
alternative estimates from line (2) provided for 6countriesin "Country
Estimates."Four of these weresupplied inthepapers, and one each wasadded
for Japan21 and for the U.S.22
In each Table (6A and 6B), col. (1) assumes that market productivity of
all women rose at the same rate as that of men. Hence the sum of husbands'
income and wives' wage elasticities was multiplied by the rate of growth of
men's real wages.23 hea levels of all women's educational attainment in 1970
(Ed70) and of urbanization in 1970 are added (col. la) the correlation is
strengthened. In col. (2) we use the cross—product of elasticities and of
wage growth of men and women, ignoring the likely biases. Indeed, the R2 is
far stronger in col. (2) and reaches a maximum of .9 in (2a) where education
level and urbanization are added. Column (3) substitutes annual growth in all
women's educational attainment over the period (1960—1980) for growt1 in wages
of working women. Here growth of men's wages is multiplied by income
elasticities (a2), while growth of education (in years) is multiplied by the
wage elasticities (a). The result is significant. The relation in cml (3)
is stronger than in (1) and in (3a) is as strong as in (la).24
Table 6B which utilizes alternative elasticities (col. 2 in Table 6) in
half of the countries shows very similar results as Table 6A. The greater
predictive power of this set of elasticity estimates within countries
apparently contributes to higher R2 in col. (1) and (2) of Table 63 compared— 17—
to6A. This is not true, however, in col. 3 andinthe columns marked (a),
where other variables are added. Also, when the U.S.S.R. and Spain are left
Out, tue correlationsincrease very little, not as in 6A.
In sum, a comparison of Table 5 and 6 (A and B) lead to thefollowing
conclusion: While growth rates of real wages across countries have a weak
relation with the differential groith rates of married women's labor force,
the relation is strong when country parameters are taken into account. In
other words, labor force growth responds to growth in real wages, but the
elasticity of the response differs among countries. Estimates of these
elasticities are quite helpful in predictLng the trends, despite the almost
certain large errors they are subject to.
The prediction (in col. 1) of Tables 6 whichassumes that potential wages
of men and women grow equally is not unbiased.Theinterceptis not 0,and
theslope of the relation is less than one—half, rather than unity. On
average, however, the prediction is surprisingly good: Iean annual labor force
growth was 2.8% per year, while the mear of [(cz +2)WMJ inTable 6A was 3.1%
and 2.9% in Table 6B, the latter even closer to the actual. when growthof
wages of men and of womeniscross—multiplied by the respective elasticities,
the correlation is stronger, and thebiasappears to be greater. Here
overprediction is clear: The mean of (a1w1+cz2WF)is 4.1% per year in Taole
6A and 3.9% in Table 6B, one—third greater than the average actual growth of
women's labor force.25
As was noted, the wage growth variable was calculated on an annual
basis for the period 1960—1975, the period of sustained growth in all of the
Western economies. Since the mid (or early) 1970's growth of real wages
slackened and almost ceased in most of the countries. Unemployment rates grew
substantially over this period (see Table 7). Table 8 indicates that growth— 13—
ofwomen's labor force rates in the 1970—80 decade wasslowedby this rather
lengthy recession. The greater the decline in the rate of growth of men's
wages MJ4 (measured by the differences between the average rate of growth in
1960—75 and the subsequent rate in 1975—80), and the greater the increase in
standardized unemployment rates, the greater the slowing of married women's
laborforce growth. Tne dominance of the "discouraged"over the "added"
workersin female labor force growth appears to be upheld on an international
basis.
III. Decline in Fertility and Growing Family Instability
In the decade of the H70's all countries experienced declines in
fertility. On average, the Total Fertility Rate (TFR) dropped from 2.42 in
1970 to below replacement level 1.85 in 1930 (Table 2). The largest declines
were observed in the Netherlands where both wage growth and women's labor
force growth were among the steepest. The smallest declines were noted in
Spain and Japan, where labor force growth was small to moderate, but wade
growth steep; in Sweden where both labor force growth and wage growth were
moderate ——butwhere criild care and provisions for parental leave may have
slowed the fertility decline; and in the U.S.S.R. where labor force growth of
women and fertility declines stopped in 197026 Comparative declines in the
Total Fertility Rate over the decade are analyzed in Table 9. Arithmetical
declines in fertility rates, rather than percentage changes were used as
dependent variables.
The regressions in Table 9 show negative, hut not insignificant effects
of male wage growth (in col. 2 and 3), but a significant positive relation
between growth of married wonen's labor force rates and declines in fertiLity
(TFR) in the 1970's.— 19—
Laborforce growth is significant on a longer—term (1960—1930) basis,
whichever labor force definition is used when Japan (cols. 1 and 2). It i.s
significant on a concurrent basis (1970—1980) only when Japan (b) was used.
none of the other variables were significant. Tnese findings are consistent
with the hypothesis of mutual causation of labor force growth and fertility
declines in the short run and with the notion that fertility declines follow
labor force growth. Effects of wage and of educational growth are not
discernible with these statistics. Such effects may be diffuse and largely
indirect at this level of analysis mainly by causing shifts of women to the
labor market.
Oivorce rates accelerated frot previous levels in all countries. Over
the decade 1970—1980, they tripled in frequency. The smallest increases were
noted in Japan and in Israel where labor force growth was small and average,
respectively; the largest increases were experienced in the Netherlands,
Australia, Britain, and the U.S. where labor force growth of married women was
above average. Table 10 summarizes inter—country regression of growth in
divorce (or separation rates) in the 1970s (measured in percent changes).27
The independent variables: growth of male wages and of women's labor force
cover the longer period from 1960 on. Labor force growth over the longer
period, rather than concurrent, was positive and significant while men's wage
growth was not significant. Neither growth of women's wages nor declines in
fertility were significant. iowever, increases in unemployment during the
seventies significantly acelerated the growth of divorce.
In sum, both fertility declines and the growth o family instability
appear to represent lagged effects of longer—term developments in the labor
force of women. Although feedbacks are very likely, growth of divorce rates
clearly lag behind labor force growth, while fertility is sensitive both to— 20—
longerrun and to current labor force growth. It is lausihle that changes in
family stability are concurrent with changes in family size, a variable that
lags current fertility change, hutthedata were not available for
verification. These findings are, in general, consistent with economic
theoriesof family behavior, hut data and degrees of freedom are lacking for
attempts to analyze more variablesor to provide a clearer delineation of
directionand strength of causal arrows acong thevarithles.Zd
IV.Trends in the Gender Wage Gap
Wages of women are lower than wages of men in all countries. The (female
to male) wage ratio ranged from 54% in Japan to 90%inSweden in U)80. This
ratherlarge variation is, in part, overstated because it is sensitive to
differences in definitions of wages ( week, month, or hour), of coverage
(all workers, full time workers, workers in the private economy, in a
particular sector, etc.). In general, the closer the definition to an hourly
wage and the narrower the coverage (e.g. withit manufacturing, orwithin the
public sector) the smaller the wage differential.
Some interpret the differential in pay between men and women as evidence
of ubiquitous and persistent discrimination traceaole back to biblical
tines. However, the existence of the "wage gap" does not by itself prove the
existence or extent of discrimination. Thus a number of sociologists and
economists have ascribed the sex differential in wages to the household's
division of labor, in which women have historically had the major
responsibility for household production, especially in child rearing. In the
past, this division of labor, especially under high fertility reJimes resulted
in almost complete specialization of women to household tasks. Even in the
20th century industrialized Western countries, where the demographic— — '-
transitionneared completion, the sexual (livision of labor permitted only a
partial cornidtment of married women's time and energy to labor market
activities and, therefore, to the acquisition of work-related skills,
especially on the job. According to this reasoning, lower wages of women
reflect the resulting differences in market productivity.
The wage ratios shown iii Table 3 are gross, in the sense that they do not
measure wage differentials for similar types of labor. When wages are
standardized by marital status, age, education, work experience and its
continuity, job training, hours of work, and other distinguishing
characteristics of workers the gross wage gap is reduced to a smaller
residual. This residual is, in turn, viewed by some as a pure rteasure of
discrimination, as it indicates different wages for "the sane" labor. Others
see it as a measure of ignorance, since many of the relevant characteristics,
some of which were listed above, are not available in the data. Most of the
authors in the present collection of studies analyzed factors determining
wages of women as a step in their analysis of labor supply, and were able to
measure the resulting reduction in he gross wage gap. Similar studies are
available in the literature in a number of countries. Reductions in the gap
range from a little over 10% in some of the Swedish and British studies to
over a half in some of the U.S. studies. The variation certainly reflects the
kind and amount of information available and applied in the wage
functions.29 Muchof thegap is attributable to differences in hours of work
and in the continuity of work experience, where such data are available. But,
even if proper standardization were to account fully for the wage gap, reasons
for the sex differences in factors affecting wages would still be subject to
debate. However, the discussion would be much better informed.
Several papers focus on the wage gap issue: Becker's theoretical analysis— 22—
linksthe wage gap and its persistence to the division of labor in the
family. Persistence of the wage differential in the U.S. over several decades
motivates also the empirical studies of O'Neill and of Smith—Ward.
A reason for the puzzle over the apparent stability of the U.S. wage gap
lies in the human capital interpretation of earnings or wage profiles of men
and women. According to this interpretation, if increased market activity of
women translates into lengthened work experience in the market as it
ultimately must,3° the sex differential in wages should eventually narrow for
at least two reasons: (1) Even if shapes of female wage profiles remained
unchanged, lengthening of women's work experience should contribute to an
increase in their wages, so long as the profiles slope upward. This effect is
reinforced, if lengthened experience denotes greater continuity of work.
Losses due to depreciation of skills whichi result from interruptions would be
reduced. (2) Increased length and continuity of work produce a longer payoff
period to human capital investments, hence an incentive for women to seek more
market oriented schooling, more job training, and occupational choices with
greater career orientation. If so, the longer female wage profile would also
become steeper.
However, given limited budgets of time and energy, commitments to market
work and to market—oriented human capital investments require major reductions
in women's responsibilities for household production, especially of those
related to child—bearing and child—care. The tension between family and
market commitments is resolved or reduced by reductions in fertility,
postponement and shorter duration of marriages, and greater capital intensity
of household work ——allobserved in most countries. On the other side of the
acconodation is the commitment to market work which, although greatly
increased, remains far from complete: Much of the growth in labor force— 24
participation, most spectacular in Sweden and in Australia, has been in part—
time jobs. Moreover, most of the increases in market employment have been in
the more traditional women's occupations in the service sectors, in jobs with
lesser traiirig components and with shorter or more flexible hours.
The reality of this accomodation is most readily apparent where it might
be expected least: in the U.S.S.R., where women's labor force participation
has reached the same level as that of men by 1970, and where part—time work is
practically not available. Fertility declined sharply by 1970 and divorce
rates continued to grow. Nevertheless, occupational segregation, whici is
less narrow in the U.S.S.R. than Ia the West (primarily because of much
greater employment of women in manual work, but also in some of the
professions) is pronounced and unchanging.31 The wage ratio at 70 is
comparable to that in the West, despite continuous life—time participation in
market work at full—time jobs. In their studies of the subject, in this
volume and elsewhere, Ofer and Vinokur conclude, that the time andenergy
burden of household work, which remains highly labor intensive ia the
U.S.S.R., leads Soviet wives to relatively undemandingjobs.
Thatthealmostequal commitment of time of men and worien to thelabor
marketdid not result in a changing division of household choresamong the
sexes is evident from the time budget data supplied by McAuley:32 Inaddition
tofull time in outside employment, married wouen in the U.S.S.R.spent
between 20—30 hours a week on housework. Their husbands spent a half or fewer
hours on household work. Total hours of workarethus very long for Soviet
wives (over 60 hours per week), and more burdensome in the relative absence of
household appliances. According to U.S. time budget studies33 the conditions
are easier, though somewhat comparable for U.S. wouen fulL—time workers.
Their total weekly hoursaddup to about 50 hours, but their burden is— 25—
lessenedat borne and at work by shorter hours, less—continuous participation,
and household equipment. The implication of lesser work effort in the market
is plausible, and more plausible for Soviet women, than for working women in
the U.S.
Similar conclusions about women's lesser coiaaitment to market work
despite rapid growth in their labor force in Sweden, are expressed by
Gustafson and Jacobson. According to them "occupational segregation" of women
haschanged 1ttle in Swedenafter decades of labor force growth whici pushed
theparticipationrate up higher than anywhere else in the vest. As already
mentioned, much of the growth has been in part—tine jobs, which are nore
easilyobtainable inthe so—calLed female occupations in the service
sectors.Commenting more generally on trends in the position of women in
Scandinavia, authors of a recent article34 describe it as follows:
"Although ...menhave assumed sone responsibility for household
chores, women still oear the main burden of housekeeping and child
care ——gainfullyemployed or not. The solution to carrying the
double burden of work inside and outside the home has been to work
part—time at the latter. 1any women who are employed full—time in
the labor force are in reality overworked."35
"Since the sixties, public authorities in the different Nordic
countries have made various efforts to change the gender—based
division of labor, but the results so far, apart from the increased
participation of women in the labor force have been meager."36
According to the authors, "patriarchal traditions" and "male dominance" are in
part responsible for the recalcitrant division of labor. But, they add:
"Uomen, however, are not entirely blameless; by continuing to seek
"women's" jobs, they also play an important part in perpetuating the
present unequal division of labor. Some, of course, are genuinely
interested in such work, but others, particularly young women, mainly
consider such employment because these jobs combine fairly easily
with the role they expect to have as wives and mothers. The working
conditions of some traditional "men's" jobs do not tempt women, being
either too or demanding too great an involvement in the
workplace. "
Thehypothesis that increases in labor force participation ought to be— 26—
reflectedin lengthened labor market experience of working women is
unassailable from an individual viewpoint but it need not apply to an
aggregate labor force which is changing, especially when it is trending
upward. Average work experience lengthens, if the intensive margin (the same
women staying longer in the narket) dominates over the extensive margin, at
which more women (with little experience, by definition) ——enteror reenter
the market. Thus, growth of the labor force may produce some growth or
decline in average work experience of working women, though the latter is mire
likely to be transitional. On this account labor force growth may produce a
narrowing or a widening of the wage gap over stretches of time.
The studies of June O'eill, Smith and Ward, and Claudia Goldin indicate
a rather small, if any, increase in the length of work experience of U.S.
working women over the past several decades. There also nay have been so-ie
small and not easily discernible increase in the slope of wage profiles. But
the small decline in the wage gap which eventually emerges in the data (since
the mid 70's) was initially more than counteracted by an adverse movement of
educational differentials between men and women workers prior to the 70's.
This rnovetaent consisted of two components: In the population, educational
attainment of men grew more rapidly than that of women between 19S) and
1970. At the same time, labor force rates of more educated women grew less
rapidly than of less educated women before 1970, thereby depressing the growth
of the average female wage rate. The consequent initial widening of the wage
gap followed by a narrowing lent a rather mild U—shape to the U.S.
pattern.38 Additional positive and negative factors are analyzed and
discussed in the U.S. studies.
The near—stability of wage differentials in the U.S., which provoked
puzzlement and analysis, turns out to be an exception in our international— 27—
comparisons.Another exception is the U.S.S.R. where the wage ratio remains
at 70, despite the almost full equality of labor force rates of men and
women, which undoubtedly also implies little difference in the length of work
experience.
Wage differentials narrowed in all other countries over the past two
decades (except that Japan's ratio narrowed in the 60's and stabilized in the
70's, and data for Spain are missing). On-average the wage ratio rose from
62% to 71% thereby closing almost one fourth of the gap.39 It is intercstin
to find (in Table 11) that the narrowing was, indeed, positively correlated,
across countries, with the rate of (married women's) labor force Jrowth. We
do not know whether this is because faster growth resulted in or from
lengthened work experience, since data on the latter are not available. The
French study indicates that married women employed in 1977 had spent about 80%
of their post—school years working,40 and a similar statistic appears in
Swedish data. The figure (at about 60%) is lower for U.S. married women
workers, whicb may explain, in part, why the U.S. wage ap is big;er. But the
comparison of uperience levels in a single year tells us nothing about
changes in the wage ratios.
In Table 11 the dependent variable is percent change in the wage ratio.
The positive correlation between labor force growth and narrowing of wage
differentials shown in col. (1) may be due to factors whichmayhave affected
both, such as growth of women's education. Coluvmn (2) shows that growth of
women's educational attainment (in the population) was, indeed, a positive and
significant factor. The significance of labor force growth is attenuated but
not neccessarily eliminated, when educational growth (E) is included.
We tried two other variables whici nay have affected the wage ratios: the
changing proportion of married couples in the population and the changing— 23—
laborforce rates of men. Adeclineintlie proportion of married occurred in
the 70's, and a decline in the labor force rates of men was observed
throughout the period, hut especially in the 70's. Neither of the variables
was siuificant, although the signs were plausible.41
Laborforce growth, per se, may have had no effect, unless it lengthened the
averagework experience of working women, a matter on which we have no data,
or unless more educated worne increased participation more rapidly than the
less educated ones. We iave no extensive information on growth of educational
attainment of working women as distinguished from allwomen. The former is
clearLy more closely connected with observed wages of women, hence also with
the wage ratios. We do have information on changes in botheclucqtional
distributionsin some of thecountries. These show that increases in labor
forcerates of Lnore educated women wereabove average titroughout theperiodin
France,Israel, the Netherlands, also in Italy, Japan and in the U.S. after
1970. So the observed narrowing of the differentials wasdue both to catching
upof women's with men's educationaL attainment in the population, as well as
toa positive educational selectivity of woiien's labor force growth during
this period.
V. Effects of Public Policy
Otner developments which may havecontributedto trends in labor force
growth and tochanges in the wage ratio are connected with public poLicy.
Changes in laws receive special attention in the Swedish, Australian, and
Britishstudies. Theyare relevant in considering developmentsin theother
countriesas well although our information on these matters is not complete.
Publicpolicy which affects labor sup?ly, fertility behavior, and more
generally the family institution does not necessarily emanate from a concern— 29—
withthese matters42 and is not necessarily designed to change them. Thus
tax, social security, and other welfare provisions are not, prima facie,
addressed to the issues under discussion. But they are certainly not 'ieutral
in their effects: Non—market (household) activities are exempt from taxes.
Iricorne—splttting among spouses for tax purposes encourages non—market
actvities relative to tax treatment which is independent of family status.
Social security provides dependent benefits which are not paid for,
encouraging nonparticipation, while employment requirements for receipts of
unemployment coo)ensation encourage labor force participation. A change from
income—splitting to individual treatment encourages labor force entry of
wives, especially at righ marginal tax rates. A shift from family—based to
individual treatment in income taxation occurred i; Sweden, the Netherlands,
Italy, and Israel. It has been in existence for a longer period in Australia
and Japan. Both a shift from family—based taxes to individual taxation and an
increase in marginal tax rates in countries which tax individuals induces more
married women into the labor force, especially spouses of higher—income
husbands. Since the correlation between earning power of spouses tends to be
positive, the tax changes are also likely to contribute to a narrowing of the
observed male—female wage gap. The tax changes instituted in Sweden in the
60's, in the Netherlands and Italy in the 70's probably affected labor force
growth and wages of working women in this fasiion. This nay have also
happened to some degree in Australia and Israel.
Additional laws which were more specifically directed at the family were
enacted in Sweden and in Israel: Long (one year) and subsidized parental
leaves in Sweden, coupled with a guaranteed return to previous employment, and
an increased supply of publicly provided day care per:nitted greater continuity
in employment of mothers. Both higher levels of labor force participation and— 30—
higherwages resulting from more continuous employment are consequently
observed. Though less generous in terms of pay, similar parental leaves were
instituted in Israel during the 70's. In addition, tax credits for children
were also introduced there. Parental leaves, day care subsidies and tax
credits are basically pro—natalist. They may have contributed to slowing of
the declines in fertility in Israel and in Sweden, as we already noted.
Another set of laws which are aimed at perceived or actual labor market
discrimination ranges in the degree of government intervention from "equal pay
forthe same job" to "equal pay for comparable work" on the wage side, ani
from "fair employment laws" to "affirmative action programs" on the employment
side. The less intrusive laws provide meclianis;ns for bringing suits against
discriminatingemployers. The more recently enacted (inthe TJ...)
"affirmativeaction" programs, and currently debated and even litigated
"comparable worth" principles call for active designation of numerical
employment "goals" and of "comparable" pay scales. Most countries enacted
some form of the usually less intrusive laws.
The U.K. study attributes a 15% rise of the relative wage of women
between 1973 and 19Th to the Equal Pay Act which was passed in 1970. Although
the growth of women's employment slowed in the late 70's both in numbers and
more so in hours, and real wages stopped growing after 1975, the study
concludes that the Equal Pay Act had no adverse effects on women's employment
relative to that of men. This was, in part, due to rapid growth of women's
employment in the public sector during the 1970s, but the conclusion is held
to be valid also for the private sector.
Most interesting is the Australian experience with pay scales, more
specifically with wage floors set by federal tibunals. Prior to 1969 the
floors were set in an unequal manner: The tribunals explicitly differentiated31
occupationsas "male" and "female" and put lower floors for "female"
occupationsand for women'swages in mixed occupations. The relative floors
wereraised from 5E,7 to 75% after the second World War.In theyears l9bO to
1972 the principle of "equal pay for equal work" was enacted which affected
women working in mixed occupations. In the 1972—75 period thefederal
tribunalintroduced the priiciple of "comparable worth," or "equal pay for
workof equal value."
The authors of the Australian study note that female relative to male
employmentcontinued to increase despite the 30Z relative wage increasewtich
theyattribute to the introduction of equal pay.3 However, even more thai in
Britain, the increase in relative employment was largely (tue to the growth of
wouen's employment in the public sector. In the private sector growth of
relative employment (measured in hours)stopped after 1972. The authors find
no evidence of excess deaand for female labor before the equal pay decisions,
hut claim that an excess supply exists since then, They are puzzled, however,
by the observation that the (relative, by sex) ratio of mean wages to wage
floors did not change throughout the period.
Even if relative employment of women did not decline, its growth
certainly slowed (especially in terms of hours worked) since 1975, below
levels expected from secular and cyclical trends.44 This is consistent with
the author's finding (Table G) thatthe estimated cross—section parameters
underpredicted the growth of participation befor the equal pay acts and
overpredictedit afterwards,
We may conclude that tax laws, parental leaves, and child—care subsidies
induced both an accelerated labor force growth of wives and mothers and a
relative growth in their wage rates. The equal pay laws apparently
contributed also to the narrowing of the wage gap in Britain and Australia,— 32—
butprobably slowed women's labor force growth.
1hat can we conclude about thefuturenarrowing of the wage gap based on
1960—1980 international experience? Some evidence was shown, that narrowing
occurred partly because of (1) women's educational growth in the population,
and more so in the labor force (2) changes in tax and other laws pertaining to
thefamily, and (3) equal pay laws in Britainand Australia. The evidence is
notsecure, and nore intensive research of theapparenteffects is very much
to be desired.
Most of the changes whichaffected the wage ratio are self—limiting.
This is true of women's educational catch—up, of tax changes, and of other
legal cuanges. Ultimately, without labor market discrimination and with equal
educational attainment, the wage gap can be eliminated only when sex
differences in life—time work experience vanish, provided differences in
investments in job market skiLls and work effort also disappear. ihether this
will happen, or to what extent the wage gap will narrow is a question of
economicand technological change as it affects work hours, location, and
flexibility of both, as much as it is a question of how the same forces will
affect the fanily institution.— 33
FOOTNOTES
Theseare: Australia, Britain, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, Japan,
Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, U.S., U.S.S.R.
2A closer picture of time allocation is given in time budgets. Only two
such surveys were available (the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.), supplied in
Becker's Appendix, and in McAuley's comments.
One half of a percent, according to McAuley.
For an analysis of such trends in LDC's, see Hill (1983).
Rates for all women began torisein Japan in the !nld—7O's. The upward
trend for paid employees is clear and strong (Japan' in Table 1). The
distinction between aggregate labor force participation and work outside
the home of Japanese women is emphasized and analyzed by Anne i-TiLL (1983,
1984).
In the U.S.S.R. the decline was much steeper before 1970, than the
subsequent rise, which is entirely due to the increasing numerical weight
of the Moslem population (see Ofer and Vinokur).
Seeh;sley Davis (1982), and giricer (1963).
The model was originally formulated and applied by Mincer (1962). Further
developments are due to Becker (1965,1931), Cain (1966), Kosters (1966),
Ueckinan (1974,1973,19b0) and Grunau (1977).
A strong substitution effect in the labor supply of women is exlainaDle
by substitutability of market goods and services for home production. See
Mincer (191,2), and Gronau (1977).
10Flowever, a sample restricted to wives who are paid employees in the Tokyo
area show a dominance of substitution effects (:-iill, 1983; Osawa, 1934).
For purposes of time—series estimation, income elasticities were
calculated as sums of elasticities of labor force growth withrespect to
growthof men's wages (WM) and to growthofother income (Y0) ——assuming
equal rates of growth.
12 Thiscan he seen by comparing the in col. (2) and col. (1) in Tanle 6,
for France, Japan, and Spain. Both U.S. estimates utilized information on
work experience.
13 Annual growth of men'swages was calculated from the 1960—75 period. See
discussion in the next section.
14 Parameters from col.(1) of Table (6), corresponding to upper rows of the
"Country Estimates" in the text.
1) Sec next section foran argument.— 34
16 The selectivityproblem is well recognized in cross—section micro—data
analyses. However, there is no reason for men's (husbands?) wages to
constitute an estimate of women's (wives?) wages in cross—sections.
17 The fastergrowth of relative wages of women was also ascribed to legal
changes in some of the papers. However, the effects of such changes on
labor force growth are ambiguous.
Evidence on this is apparent in comparisons of sex differetitials in school
enrollment rates among countries differing in levels of income (e.g. World
Development Report, 19Q). The difference may be muchsmallerwithin the
group of hig income countries. In the 2dth century the J.S. differential
in enrollment rates existed only at post—high school levels. It widenened
afterthe Second War(most likely as a result of Gt Bills) and vanished
before1970. Differential change, ifany,was uni—directional in European
countries.
19 Exceptions indefinitionare noted inTable1 for 4 countries.
2uThe use of (P) instead ofPin Tables 5and6 (A and3) resulted in
weakened correlations of all variables, except the level of P70 wuich
became positive and significant. Apparently, therelative growth oflabor
forceparticipation was inverse to level at the extremes of the range but
absolute change was positively related to levels throughout most of the
range. At any rate, our double log specification of the labor force
equation (1) and (2) fits better than a linear specification.
21 In theirpaper, Shimada and Higuchi estimated cross—section elasticities
for a large sample of women in employee households. These elasticities
(col. I of Table 6) are supplied to explain growth of the labor force of
such women (data shown for Japan (a) in the right—hand panel of Table
1).1. Osawa (1984) using RELP information estimated elasticities for a
smaller sample of married women who were paid employees in the Tokyo
area. These elasticities (col. 2 of Table 6) are applied to the growth of
labor force of married women who are paid employees (data for Japan (b) in
the right—hand panel of Table 1).
22 The alternative U.S. estimate is the firstever RELPestimates,calculated
from micro—data by Cain (1966, Table 29, col. V).
23 As is indicated in Table3, annual rates of growth of men's wages were
based on the period 1960—75, prior to the world—wide stagnation that set
in the mid—70's. Additional effects of the stagnation on labor force
growth in the 1970's are analyzed in Table 7. Income elasticities were
calculated as sums of elasçicites with respect to Y() and W, on the
assumption that over time Y0 =W1.
24 Notsurprisingly, the correlations are increased when the U.S.S.R. and
Spain are left out. R2 rises from .43 to .72 in col. (1), from .79 to .84
in col. (2), and fron .39 to .71 in col. (3). Also (tE) in col. (2)
becomes significant even without the coefficient in the set of 10
countries (not shown).— 35
25 Note that thesepredictions are calculated as averages of products (of
elasticity times wage growth) rather than products of averages as on p. 13
above.
26 See footnote 6.
27 Data forSpain were missing.
23 For anattempt at such an analysis of U.S. data, see R. L'lichael's
contribution in this vol.une.
29 Fora more detailed survey see June O'Neill (1984).
3uButwork experience riced not lengthen before that stage is reached, and
thewage gap nay even widen over the transition period.
31According to McAuley's comment. See also Ofer and Vinokur (1983).
32 His commentsat the Sussex Conference.
See Appendix Table in Becker's paper.




The reversal started in the mid 70's, not visible in ourTable 3.
At this pace the gap would fully close in the middle of the next century.
40Table 5,bottom row, in Riboud's paper.
41The decline in the fraction of married couples could plausibly narrow the
wage ratio, since marital status has apositive effect on wades of menand
anoppositeeffect on wages of women. Thedeclinein the laborforce
rates of men, which occurred mainly at both ends of the wage spectrum
could widen the differential.
42 Potentialpolicy implications of these issues are discussed in Clerr Cain's
paper.Not surprisingly, views on normative issues differed widely in
Conference discussions.
For industry details see also Gregory and 1)uncan (1981).
Itshouldbe noted that labor force rates of men decLinel in the 70s in
Australia (by 4.3 points),astheydid ii Britain (3.5points)and inmost
oftheother countries (the decline was 3.8 points in the U.S.), accor-ling
to comments by Axel Mittelstildt.This biases the relative employment of
women upwards. Also, slowing of married women's female labor force growth
in recessions was counteracted, in part, by the Australian law which— 36—
deniesunemployment compensation to wives of spouses whose eirnings exceed
a (low) level. The "added worker" effect in recessions is, thereby,
strengthened.Table 1
Labor Force Participation Rates
All Women and harried Women, 1960, 1970, 1980.
12 Countries
All Women' Married Women2
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Country 1960 1970 1980 1960 1970 1980growthper
an nuil
Australia 29.5 42.355.4 19.2 36.550.84.86
Britain 43.4 54.662.3 33.74d.8 57.2 2.64
France 44.5 47.157.0 35.641.5 52.6 1.95
Germany 46.5 50.956.2 36.542.7 54.42.00
Israel 29•0a 370b 392 25•7a360b 4352.63
Italy 35.2 33.839.9 18.5 24.2 35.43.24
japana 477C50.0 52.7 360C39• 41.9 1.00
japan" 21.9 27.0 29.5 12•6d 18.3 26.04.02
Netherlands 49.043.9 34.9 7.6 17.3 30.66.96
Spai: 22•7a 26.1 33.2 n.a.16.3 26.02.37
Sweden •51•0a 60.1 76.9 43.1 56.2 75.62.1
U.S.A. 37.8 43.451.3 305a 403a 51a 48
U.S.S.R. 77.489.488.2 77.489.4 8;3.2 .66
'Over 15 years of age, exceptions noted
2Ages 20—59, exceptions noted
Israel (a) 1961 (b) 1975, all ages
Japan (a) All Women, ages 20—64, in nonagricultural households and Married
Women in employee households
(b) Paid employees, all ages
(c) 1965
(d) 1962
Spaii(a) 1964, all Women, ages 20—59
U.S. (a) All ages
U.S.S.. All Women,ages20—54
Sources:Country papers and authors.
Japan: Bureau of Women and Youth, Ministry of Labor, Status
ofWomen, Tokyo, Ministry of Finance Printing Office, 1982.Table 2
Total Fertility Rates and )ivorce Rates,
12 Countries, 1970, 1980
TFR2 Divorce Rates2
Country 1970 1980 1970 1980
Australia 2.56 190a .98 2()2C
Britain 2.44 1.89 1.17 3.01
France 2.48 1.97 .79
Germany 2.02 1.38 .51 .63
Israel 3.41 2.76 .81 1.14
Italy 2.42 1.84
Japan 2.16 177b 1.21
'etherlands 2.58 1.61 .79 l.6Y
Spain 2.84 2.65 n.a. n.a.
Sweden 1.92 1.68 1.61 2.39
U.S. 2.8 3.51 5.19
U.S.S.R. 1.77 2.04 2.ô2 3.50
Notes to Table 2: TFR=Total Fertility Rate =sunof age—specific birth





Sources: Australia, U.S.S..: The orld Bank, World Development Report, 1983.
Israel: CBS, Statistical Abstract; reference in this volume.
Japan: Prime -1inister's Office, Japan Statistical Yearbook; tn this
volume.
Sweden: SOS Befolkningsfl3r1ridringar; in this volume.
U.S.: U.S. Bureau of Census, $tatistical Abstract of the U.S., 192.
others: Statistical Office of the European Community,
Demographic Statistics, 1931.
2. Number of final divorce decrees granted under civil law, per 1000
population. Exception: Germany, per 10,000 marriages.
Source: U.N. Demographic Yearbook, 1972, 19:31.Table 3



























3. Hourly wages, aggregate, except:
Australia: Teekly, full tLrne workers
Britaifl :iourly, manual workers
France :Annual, full time workers
Italy and Sweden: Hourly, in manufacturing
4. Classification by sex not available for Spath.
Wage growth of women assuned equal to wage growth of men.
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(Average Years of Schooling)
















































all except those in school
all except those in school





Sources: Country papers andauthors.Table 5
Annual Growth of Labor Force Rates
of Married Women, 196U—1980
Variables (la) (2a) (ib) (2b)
.018 .013 .012 .006
(1.3) (1.1) (1.0) (.7)
.22 —1.08 .42 —1.04
(.7) (1.7) (1.6) (2.3)
WF 1.20 1.35
(2.2) (3.5)
.05 .25 .11 .38
!otes:
1. Regressions (a) and(b)contain alternative labor force sectors in
Japan: (a) pertains to labor force growth of married woiaeri in
employee households, (b) pertains to labor force growth of narried
women who were paid enployees. Sources in Table 1.
2. W1 assumed equal toforSpain, where a breakdown by skx is not
available for wages.
3. R is adjusted for degrees of freedom.Table 6




Australia 1.83—.66 .93 —.39
Britain .35 —.36 .49 —.04
France 1.15—.32 .58 —.17
Cermauy .72 —.63 .72 —.63




Netherlands 2.02 —.37 2.02—.37
Spain 1.79—.64 .54 —.23
Sweden .80 —.24 .S0 —.24
U.S. .82 —.52 .73 —.07
U.S.S.R. .53 +.01 .53 +.01
Mean 1.02—.37 .90 —.26
Notes to Table 6:
Japana: ased on national samples of employee families (Shimada, et al.,
1981).
japanb: Based on sample of wives who were paid employees in the Tokyo area
(Osawa,1984).Table 6a
Annual Growth of Labor Force Rates
of Married Women, 1960—1980
Intercountry Regression (1)
Variables (1) (Ia) (2) (2a) (3) (3a)
.018 —.045 .015 —.044 .003 —.056










E70 .0025 .003 .0035
n.s. (1.7) (1.5)
Urb70 .0005 .0003 .0005
(1.3) (1.7) (1.5)
.43 .82 .66 .91 .68 .81
'lote:
Col. (la), (2a), (3a) exclude Spain for which education data are
unavailable.Table 6B
Annual Growth of Labor Force Rates
of Married Women, 1960—1980
Intercouritry Regression (2)
Variables (1) (Ia) (2) (2a) (3) (3a)
c .017 —.023 .016 —.012 .014 —.039
(4.0) (.7) (4.7) (.4) (2.3) (1.2)
.443 .463
(4.2) (4.2)
a +a7'., .374 .410 1 F — (5.8) (5.4)
a —.223 .031







Urb70 .0006 .0004 .0004
(1.7) (1.3) (1.')
R2 .60 .62 .75 .77 .43
Note:
SeeTable 6A.Table 7
Slowdown in ?len's Wage Growth, 197() to 1980
Increases in Unemployment Rates 1974—1)80













1. Calculated as : '1 (60—75) —
W.1(75—80), annual rates.
Exceptions noted for the seconi ter!0:
France : (75 —78)
Sweden : WM (— 1)
NetherlandsW4 (70 —73)
Also see notes in Table 3 for exceptions
2. Calculated as differences between age and sex standardized unemploynent
rates in 1980 and in 1974. (ILO, Jorld Labor Report, 1934).Table 8
Regressions of Married Iornen
Labor Force Growth, 1970—1980
Variables El.(l) El.(2)
c .011 .019 ,021 .024
(1.8) (2.3) (7.0) (3.3)
(al+a2)M .438 .470 .319 .289











Declines in Total Fertility Rates, 1970—1930
Variables (a) (b)
(1) (2) (3)










(a) Using P in Japan (a)
(b) Using P in Japan (b)
U.S.S.R.excludedTable 10












(2) P in Japan (b)
Spain and U.S.S.R. ec1udedTable 11
Changes in Wade Ratios
10 Countries, 1960—1q80
Variables (1) (2) (1) (2)
c .0035 —.002 .002 —.002
(1.5) (.7) (.8) (.9)
(60—8o) .139 .064 .169 .089




R2 .25 .58 .34 .62
U.S..R. and Spain excluded
(a) in Japan (a)
















Dot over variable denotes annual rate of growth
a ——basedonJapan(a),b ——basedon Japan(b)
=annualrate of growth of female to male wage ratioRE FERENCS
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